Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright

STEPHEN M. MCJOHN'

The fair use doctrine of copyright law permits use of a copyrighted
work without permission of the copyright holder. 1 Fair use authorizes
one to tape a television program for later viewing, 2 to write a parody of
a copyrighted song,3 or to photocopy a law review article for research.
It does not permit a magazine to publish key passages from a forthcoming autobiography of President Ford,4 or permit a television station to
copy and televise a news service's videotape of an assault,5 or permit
a corporation systematically to make copies of academic articles in lieu
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I. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 1996). For comprehensive discussions of the fair
use doctrine, see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT ch. 10 (2d ed. 1996) (comprehensive
analysis of fair use); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 67-70
(1967) (discussing development of the fair use doctrine and its relationship to overall
infringement analysis); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT 13 (1996); WILLIAM F. PATRY, I COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 718-783
(1994) (relating origins and development of statutory provision of fair use and collecting
judicial interpretations); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAW (1985) (thorough account of the development of the fair use doctrine in English
and American courts) [hereinafter FAIR USE]; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); see also DONALDS. CHISUM &
MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4-175 to 4-222
(1992) (clear and practical assessment of developments in fair use).
2. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
3. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
4. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
5. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir.
I 997).
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of subscribing to the journals. 6 As digital technologies expand the
possibilities for creative works, the breadth of the fair use doctrine will
affect the control given copyright holders. Although attempts have been
made, the fair use doctrine has not been reduced to a single form
susceptible of straightforward application. 7 Authorities regularly call
fair use so malleable as to be indeterminate. 8 For example, the
application of fair use to photocopying is unsettled despite decades of
litigation. 9 Fair use cases seem to produce a disproportionate share of
reversals and divided courts. 10 Accordingly, the demand is great
among courts and commentators for a clear approach to fair use. 11
In recent years, increasing support has coalesced for a view that
promises to reduce fair use to a simple, elegant conceptual framework,
which will be termed the "transaction cost approach." 12 Under that

6. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994).
7. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Disti/Ung the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright
Law. 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988) (attempting to clarify fair use).
8. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note I. at§ 13.05 [A], 3-156 to 3-159 (describing
fair use's "infinite elasticity" and noting that it may not be applied predictably); see also
Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1395, 1457 (1996) (describing fair use as an "already murky provision"); Fisher, supra
note I, at 692-94 (criticizing fair use as vague, ambiguous, and fragmented); Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. I 137,
1137 (1990) (stating that fair use has baffled judges. lawyers, scholars, journalists,
critics, historians, and publishers); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use
Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667,
667-68 (1992) (collecting descriptions of fair use that describe it as "intricate and
embarrassing," "troublesome," and full of "thorniness").
9. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997) (divided en bane Sixth Circuit
opinion holding that fair use did not authorize making of photocopied course pack
materials from various sources); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881
(2d Cir. 1994); Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Note, Fair Use and University Photocopying:
Addison-Wesley Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669
(1986) (describing early difficulties in applying fair use to photocopying).
10. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990).
I I. Id. at I 106-07.
12. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
(1995)
(visited
May
27,
1998)
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii> [hereinafter White Paper].
For
commentators applying several variations of the transaction cost approach to fair use, see
GOLDSTEIN, supra note I. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Fair Use]; I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright)
in Cvberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-61 (1989)
(economic analysis employing transaction cost approach to fair use, although balancing
approach to copyright generally used in the article). These commentators' approaches

62

[VOL. 35: 61, 1998]

Copyright
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

view, fair use should only apply to overcome certain narrowly defined
cases of market failure-settings where transaction costs impede
voluntary licensing agreements. 13 That approach would narrow the
application of fair use-and further narrow it with increasing use of
networked communications, on the grounds that transaction costs shrink
as the links between parties increase in number and speed. 14 That
narrower view of fair use is reflected in judicial decisions, 15 academic
commentary 16 and proposed amendments to adapt the copyright statute

could be interpreted as giving a considerably different scope to fair use. For an
economic argument at the opposite end of the copyright protection spectrum, see Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyrights in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (questioning the need for
copyright as an incentive for publication of many types of works). See also Barry W.
Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A
Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. I 100 (1971) (arguing copyright is
necessary to protect publishers against free-riders). For a general analysis of the need
for copyright law, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343
(1989) [hereinafter Inquiry] (comparing a hypothetical legal regime of no copyright law
with present regime).
13. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 12. For sharp criticism of the White
Paper's legislative proposals, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS
136-39 (1996). See also Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: The
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (I 994) (criticizing proposed
extensions of copyright's exclusive rights and questioning interpretations of existing
law); Henry 0. Towner, Comment, Copyright on the Information Highway: A Critical
Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to the Copyright Act, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 261
(1996).
14. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG To
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 224 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir.
1995) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 198-205); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 21519).
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14; Fair Use, supra note 12; Hardy, supra note 12.
See also Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property:
Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1995). Just how far the privatization
approach would extend depends on how broadly it construes market failure. For
example, fair use could remain relatively broad if market failure included refusals to
license by authors for nonfinancial reasons or for reasons of strategic advantage. See
Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1632-35 (discussing "anti-dissemination motives" as a barrier
to voluntary transactions); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoners
Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992) (demonstrating
how strategic behavior may prevent licensing in various contexts). Another approach
would be to take a more broadly critical analysis of transaction cost theory, together with
an analysis of the "public good" nature of copyright. Cf Jeffery Atik, Complex
Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus L. 1 (1995).
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to the world of networked digital communication. 17 Even commentators less sympathetic to expanded copyright have noted an apparent
narrowing of fair use. 18
The transaction cost view of fair use, as Part I explains, takes the
"tragedy of the commons," a celebrated insight about real property, and
seeks to apply to it to intellectual property. 19 Where property is held
in common, with unlimited access to all, individuals may use it
wastefully, because they do not bear the costs. 20 In addition, because
access is free, no market mechanisms form to channel resources toward
the highest valued use. The transaction cost approach takes a similar
view of the intellectual property created by copyright. In this view,
permitting fair use of a copyrighted work is, to the extent of that use,
tantamount to holding the work in common, leading to inefficient
overuse of the resource and blocking pricing signals. Accordingly, fair
use should be limited to situations where transaction costs impede
licensing transactions. In one elegant conceptualization, fair use serves
simply as "a compulsory license provision with a royalty of zero," 21
applicable in situations where the copyright holder would not have
received a royalty anyway because of transaction costs. Such situations,
in the view of many, will become fewer and fewer as technology lowers
transaction costs by facilitating the dissemination and licensing of
copyrighted works. In a world where copies can be distributed worldwide and software can be used to form licensing contracts (such as

17. The policies underlying proposed legislation to adapt copyright to such media
as the Internet are set forth in the White Paper, supra note 12. The White Paper
suggests that fair use should be narrowed in light of copyright management technology
and further states that the burden of showing fair use should rest on the user. See id. at
73, 82.
18. See, e.g.. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1197 (1996) (suggesting copyright expansion is due to both interest-group
politics and rhetoric that enforces consolidation of entitlements); Cate, supra note 8, at
1423 (arguing fair use as currently applied is unlikely to mitigate "the technological
extension of the exclusive right to reproduce"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining
Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 546 (1996) ("As
Congress and various courts have expanded the scope of the author's protected interest,
so too have they narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine."). Professor Robert P.
Merges has recently suggested that, because the market failure approach leads to a
narrowing of fair use with new technologies, fair use analysis should shift to
emphasizing redistribution, seeing fair use as a means to subsidize certain classes of
uses. See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I 15, 133-35
(1997).
19. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 218.
20. See DAVID w. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
AND ECONOMICS 28-32 (1992) (discussing inefficient incentives that can be created by
common property rights).
21. Hardy, supra note 12, at 240.
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clicking on an icon to accept terms), the need to apply fair use will
shrink, 22 Accordingly, fair use would gradually give way to licensed
uses, 23 Such reliance on market-oriented economic theory has been
termed a "neoclassical" view 24 or a "property rights" approach to
copyright 25 Because it holds that extending copyright protection as far
as markets can reach will ultimately benefit all, it has been called the
view of "copyright optimists," 26 Considering this Article will be
primarily interested on its effect on public domain, the term "privatization" will be utilized,
This Article argues against a narrowing of the fair use doctrine, Part
II discusses how differences between real property and intellectual
property undercut the application of the tragedy of the commons to the
fair use setting, While real property is a limited resource, intellectual
property is not The same parcel of land may not support an unlimited
number of grazing sheep, But making one more copy of a book does
not destroy other copies (although it may reduce their market value), 27
The ideas in the book, indeed, may gain value from use, refinement, and
propagation, Thus, the same public good28 nature of works of authorship that justifies intellectual property also differentiates it from real
property, Moreover, the boundaries in copyright are far more uncertain
than those around a parcel of land, Copyright demarcates protected
22. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 197-236; Hardy, supra note 12, at 240. On the
proposition that networked communications will reduce transaction costs, see I. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cybenpace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1033-36
(1994). See also Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311,
323 (1995). On the adaptation of copyright to the Internet generally, see Eugene
Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995) (discussing
social consequences of networked communications and legal ramifications).
23. See also Cate, supra note 8, at 1425 (discussing how digital payment
technologies and proliferation of markets may reduce the scope of fair use doctrine).
24. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L. REV. L.J. 283, 306-14 (1996).
25. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1044-47 (1997).
26. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 14-18.
27. See Breyer, supra note 12, at 288-89 (distinguishing copyright from tangible
property on the basis that concepts such as congestion and limited amounts are
inapplicable).
28. The general justification for intellectual property is that public goods may be
underproduced. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-15,
141-44 (1988). On implications of the public good approach for software copyright, see
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 921-22
(I 992).
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subject matter with elusive distinctions-originality, abstraction, and
functionality.
Part II further addresses the theoretical underpinning of the transaction
cost approach, the idea that copyright should be maximally privatized. 29
Under that view, concentrating control in the hands of the author by
constricting fair use would most efficiently exploit the resource. But this
view overlooks factors that can prevent copyright holders from
permitting many uses. First, transaction costs are not the only obstacle
to licensing valuable uses. Issues of status, 30 risk aversion, and other
obstacles to negotiations could obstruct licensing of many productive
uses. 31 Second, increases in electronic commerce and communications
will lower some types of transaction costs, but many components are
likely to remain unaffected. Accordingly, the Internet will not yield the
frictionless marketplace postulated by the transaction cost view.
Reducing the scope of fair use could create deadweight loss to productive uses. 32

29. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 229 (arguing for "extending copyright into
every corner of economic value"); Hardy, supra note 12, at 217 (arguing that copyright
should be employed to privatize intellectual property as much as possible). Copyright
property theorists draw from such ground-breaking work in economics as Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) and
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. ECON. 265
(1977). For a broad critical analysis of the implications of property rights theory for
intellectual property law, see Lemley, supra note 25, at 1044-47. See also Laurie
Steams, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism. Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 513 (I 992) (criticizing application of property metaphor to words).
30. Considerations of status can interfere with negotiation of mutually beneficial
bargains. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. I (1992); see
also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (describing empirical
investigation of interpersonal comparisons interfering with negotiation of agreements).
31. The question of whether voluntary transactions can reliably shift intellectual
property efficiently also goes to the heart of another core issue of copyright protection,
whether copyright entitlements should be protected by property or by liability rules. See,
e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655 (1994) (discussing transactional difficulties and institutional responses in
intellectual property). For a reexamination of the received view of the effect of legal
rules on bargaining, see Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Rules as Auctions: Property,
Proposing Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, I06 YALE L.J. 703 (1996) (proposing that
property rules and liability rules are special cases of a more general class of rules).
Another open issue, key to the scope of copyright, is the extent to which state contract
law is preempted by federal copyright law. See, e.g., David Rice, Puhlic Goods, Private
Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software Licenses Prohibitions
Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992): Brandon L. Grusd, Note,
Contracting Beyond Copyright: Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353
(1997) (analyzing recent case of first impression).
32. The public domain is itself a key resource for the further production of creative
works. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual
Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I, 191 (1994-1995);
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Part III discusses an alternative, the balancing view of fair use, which
relies on a different view of the property created by copyright, 33 The
transaction cost view conceptualizes intellectual property as a single
resource that can be split up in pieces and identified with the copies of
the work, But the rights under copyright are not coextensive with the
physical copies, Others remain free to copy the ideas expressed in a
copyrighted work, 34 the functional aspects of the work, and the facts
from the work. 35 Fair use has served as a device to ensure that the
copyright owner's control over the expressive aspects of her work do not
extend to the noncopyrightable aspects.
Part IV compares the transaction cost view and the balancing view of
fair use in the context of a number of live issues: whether a temporary
copy in a computer's memory infringes copyright, how much legal
protection should be afforded copy protection technology, how broad the
exclusive right to make derivative works should be, whether one could
archive the World Wide Web, and the application of fair use to
photocopying and other means of reducing the costs of disseminating
copies. This Article will conclude that, although the transaction cost
approach might simplify fair use analysis, it would do so by undercutting
certain core limitations on copyright. Rather than shrinking away in the
digital age, fair use should continue to be a means to implement the
balances struck by copyright law.

Jessica A. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Paul J. Heald,
Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New
Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981 ). See also Francis
M. Nevins, The Doctrine of Copyright Ambush: Limitations on the Free Use of Public
Domain Derivative Works, 25 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 58 (1981).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88.
34. See, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,
56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989).
35. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995); Baker v. Selden, IOI U.S. 99
(1879). For applications of that venerable doctrine to new technology, see Peter S.
Menell, An Analysis of the Scope ofCop_vrightfor Application Programs, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1045 (1989). See also J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific
Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University
Research, 42 V AND. L. REV. 639 ( 1989); Timothy S. Teter, Merger and the Machines:
An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibilitv Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45
STAN L. REV. 1061 (1993).
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I.

THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH TO FAIR USE

As the following parts will discuss, the scope of fair use depends on
the relationship between fair use and the other limitations on copyright.
The transaction cost approach views fair use as an autonomous doctrine,
which functions only to rectify certain market failures. This Article will
argue that fair use plays a more integral role in copyright law, giving
effect to the other limitations. As a prelude to that discussion, this Part
sketches the doctrinal place of fair use in copyright law and describes
the transaction cost approach to the doctrine's proper scope. A number
of works describe the historical development of fair use in case law and
legislation. 36 Accordingly, this Part focuses on the place of fair use
among the various limitations on the subject matter and exclusive rights
of a copyright.
A.

Fair Use and the Other Limitations on Copyright

The privatization approach would make fair use independent of the
other limitations on copyright, by making transaction costs the primary
focus of fair use analysis. Because this Article will argue that fair use
is more closely related to the other limitations, this section first outlines
the overall structure of copyright law. The author of an original work
of authorship receives the copyright in the work. 37 Copyright's broad
scope extends to the entire range of creative works: letters, 38 history
books, 39 paintings, 40 songs,4 1 video games, 42 movies, 43 and computer programs. 44 The copyright holder has a number of exclusive

36. See sources cited supra note I.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 1996).
38. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
biographer's use of J.D. Salinger's unpublished letters was not protected by fair use);
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1991 ).
39. See, e.g., Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 316 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1963).
40. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'! Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62
(3rd Cir. 1978) (wildlife paintings).
41. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946) (involving an
infringement action of Cole Porter compositions "Begin the Beguine" and "My Heart
Belongs to Daddy").
42. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying fair use to a device that made various changes in play of video
game).
43. See, e.g., Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (l 990) (involving a fair use case of
Alfred Hitchcock's film, Rear Window).
44. The extent of copyright protection afforded computer programs is subject to
evolving case law. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software
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rights.45 Only the holder of the copyright may make copies of the
work, make derivative works, distribute copies of the work to the public,

Copyright?, IO HIGH TECH L.l I (1995); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v, Leadership Software,
Inc., 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994) (joining "consensus" among courts that non-literal
elements programs were protectable, but not defining the extent of such protection);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Plains
Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding copyright not applicable to the functional structure of a computer program);
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986) (an early
case, frequently criticized, that held "structure, sequence, and organization" of computer
programs were copyrightable expression). For sharply different views on how broad
copyright protection for software should be, compare Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright,
Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1987) (arguing
that copyright law should forbid only near-literal copying) and Anthony L. Clapes, et al.,
Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REY. 1493 (1987) (arguing that computer
programs should receive protection as broad as literary works generally). See also
Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process or Protected Expression?; Determining the
Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV.
866 (I 990); David C. Tunick, How to Avoid Infringing the Copyright of a Computer
Program: From the Perspective of a Computer Programmer Turned Attornev/Law
Professor, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1996) (discussing permissible borrowings from
existing programs under recent interpretations of software copyright); Annotation,
Copyright Protection of Computer Programs Under Federal Copyright Laws, 70 A.LR.
FED. 176 ( 1997). Copyright analysis could benefit by more precise attention to computer
science concepts. See Randall Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequences for
Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299 ( 1992); Marci A. Hamilton
& Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent
law, IO HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239 (1997); see also William F. Patry, Copyright and
Computer Programs: It's All In The Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. I
(1996) (calling for courts to be stricter in applying statutory terms in software cases).
45. Title 17 of the United States Code section I 06 provides that:
[T]he owner of the copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
authorize any of the following:
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. 106 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
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or publicly display the work or perform the work in public. 46 Thus, if
an author has written a play, then others may infringe the copyright by
making copies of the play, making a movie derivative of the play,
distributing copies of the play, performing the play in public, or
displaying the text to the public. But the control over the work granted
by copyright is far from total. The prerogatives granted are limited to
the exclusive rights listed in the statute. Others may make use of the
copyrighted work in ways that do not fall within the exclusive rights.
One does not need permission to read a copyrighted book or write about
a copyrighted painting.
A number of subject matter limitations also cut into the scope of the
copyright. A copy of a play contains copyrighted expression subject to
the author's exclusive rights, but the copy also embodies much that is
not subject to protection. First, copyright protects only original
expressive elements. 47 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court
held there was no infringement where the maker of a telephone directory
copied another directory's factual listings of names and numbers because
an author does not create facts. 48 The originality requirement also
limits the protection given fictional works, which necessarily use
elements that are not the author's original expressions. 49 To the extent
a work incorporates nonoriginal elements such as commonplace plot
devices, others are free to copy such elements without the permission of
the copyright holder. 50
Another profound limitation is the rule that copyright does not restrict
the use of ideas. 51 The author's copyright protects only expression;
others are free to copy or apply the author's ideas. 52 A pair of opinions
by Judge Learned Hand best illustrate the rather elusive distinction. In
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 53 Judge Hand held there
was no infringement where the second author copied such elements as
a quarrel between Jewish and Irish fathers, marriage of their children,
reconciliation, and some stock characters. By contrast, in Sheldon v.

46.
47.
48.
49.

17 U.S.C. § I 06 (I 995 & Supp. 1996).
Copyright subsists "in original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995).
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See Litman, supra note 32.
SO. Id.
51. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356-59 (1991);
Jane C. Ginsburg, "No Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
lnfor11111tion After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).
52. See generally Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's Total Concept and Feel, 38
EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
53. 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930).

70

[VOL 35: 61, 1998]

Copyright
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 54 the copying was more specific.
The second author took more than the plot of the play, in which a young
woman poisoned an overly ardent lover but won acquittal after some
friendly perjury, the author took the specific events and details of
various scenes such as the use of a gaucho song as an aphrodisiac,
conveniently mislaid poison, and a thwarted attempt to make a telephone
call for aid.
The distinction between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas carries over to the line of cases under Baker v. Selden,
now codified in the copyright statute. 55 These cases hold that the
functional aspects of a work are unprotected by copyright, but its
aesthetic, expressive aspects are protected. The lower level of protection
afforded works with functional aspects has become especially important
as copyright law has been extended to computer software. It is
established that one cannot simply copy every byte of a copyrighted
program and sell copies, but how much protection copyright affords
beyond that is unsettled. 56
The originality requirement and the nonprotection of ideas are limits
on each of the copyright holder's exclusive rights. The Copyright Act
further provides specific limits applicable to only some of the exclusive
rights. The copyright owner's exclusive rights to distribute and display
the work are subject to the first sale doctrine, which provides that the

54. 81 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. I 936).
55. IOI U.S. 99 (1879).
56. Recent years have seen several distinct judicial approaches to software
copyright. See Lemley, supra note 44. Most issues remain unsettled. Cf Pamela
Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Software Copyright Law and the Perils
of Teaching It, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 66 (1988) (listing open issues in
software copyright, most of which remain open). For example, an interesting question
is the extent of copyright protection that could be available for original elements of a
programming language. See Elizabeth G. Lowry, Copyright Protection for Computer
Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 EMORY L.J. 1293 (1990);
Richard H. Stern, Copyright in Computer Programming Languages, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321 (I 99 I). On whether copyright is suited to protection of
software, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority
of Copyright Over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 C0LUM L. REV.
2559 (1994) and Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). See also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to In.formation Products: Muscling Copyright and
Patent Into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195; A.
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer
Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1991).
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owner of a lawfully made copy may display or dispose of that particular
copy. 57 Thus, the owner of a painting may display the painting or sell
it. The public display and performance rights are subject to a number
of specific exceptions. Although the author of a song generally has the
exclusive right to perform it in public (whether live or through a
recording), the statute authorizes performances in face-to-face nonprofit
teaching, in religious services, during charitable events, or by playing a
modestly sized radio in a business. 58 Some limitations are geared to
specific types of copyrightable works. The copyright in an architectural
work is not infringed by taking a picture of a building visible to the
public. 59 The copyright in a computer program is not infringed if the
owner of a copy of the program makes a copy in order to use the
program or to have a back-up copy. 60
The fair use doctrine is a general limitation on all the copyright
holder's exclusive rights. Without the author's permission, someone
may make copies (or make derivative works, or perform the work, or
display or distribute copies) if the activity qualifies as fair use. 61
Rather than attempt to define fair use, the copyright statute lists
particular uses likely to qualify as fair use: criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 62 Whether a use falls
into one of the favored categories, however, does not determine whether
it is a fair use. A use outside the categories may qualify as fair use, and
a use within a favored category may fail to qualify. The statute further
requires a court to consider four factors drawn from a nineteenth century
opinion by Justice Story: 63

57. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1995). Computer programs and recordings of music have
been partially excepted from the first sale doctrine, for fear of rampant copying.
§ 109(b); see Kenneth R. Corsello, The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of
1990: Another Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 177 (1991). One
could use fair use to fashion a digital equivalent of the first sale doctrine, on the grounds
that it is fair use to make a new copy provided that the first copy is destroyed. Cf Mark
Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 145-46
(l 997) (discussing the conceptual difference between copying to reproduce and to
transfer).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1995).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (1995).
60. 17 u.s.c. § 117 (1995).
61. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1995).
62. id.
63. In short, we must often. in deciding questions of this sort. look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841 ).
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(I)

the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 64
The provision does not provide particularly clear guidance in deciding
whether a particular use qualifies. A court must first decide whether the
use falls into one of several broad and vague categories. The court is
then to apply four factors, but not told how to weigh any of the factors
against each other. Accordingly, fair use is considered difficult and
unpredictable. 65
The greatest uncertainty of fair use is where it fits in the overall
framework of copyright law. The next section discusses how the
privatization approach to copyright would make fair use independent of
the other limitations on copyright by making transaction costs the
primary focus of fair use analysis.
B.

The Transaction Cost Approach to Fair Use

Although this Article will argue that the transaction cost approach
results in an unsatisfactory and narrow view of fair use, the approach
does have some merit in that it reduces a tangled doctrine to a clear
conceptual framework. Under the transaction cost approach, the primary
question would be whether defendant's use could have occurred by
obtaining a license from the copyright holder. If defendant could have
sought permission from the copyright holder, then fair use would be
unlikely to apply. If transaction costs or other narrowly defined market
failures would have prevented a voluntary transaction, then fair use
would be more likely to apply.
The transaction cost approach rests on the paradigmatic justification
for private property, the "tragedy of the commons," which demonstrates
how dividing resources into privately owned parcels can lead to greater

64. 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (1995).
65. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 25, at 992 (describing fair use as "fraught with
uncertainty").
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social welfare than holding the resources in common. One might think
that public ownership of property with unrestricted access to all would
permit the greatest social benefits. But where property is held in
common, meaning everyone may use it freely, there are great incentives
for inefficient behavior. 66 Individuals are likely to consume resources
without taking into consideration the costs. Classic examples are
littering, over-grazing, and pollution. Where property is privately held,
an individual both receives the benefits and bears the costs of a
particular use, so the individual has an incentive to use the property as
efficiently as possible. If another individual can get greater benefit from
that particular piece of property, then the second individual may
purchase it. Thus, privatization of property has two primary functions.
First it internalizes costs and benefits, increasing the chances that
resources will be used efficiently. 67 Second, it permits markets to form,
permitting resources to flow, through voluntary transactions, to the
highest-valued use. 68 The transaction cost view of fair use takes a
similar view of the intellectual property created by copyright. Under
that approach, copyright privatizes intellectual property by according the
copyright holder the bundle of exclusive rights. Concentrating the rights
in one place gives the copyright holder an incentive to exploit them in
an effective manner. If someone else can make more valuable use of
any or all of the rights, then the other may pay for an assignment of the
copyright or a license of some of the: rights. Indeed, permitting others
to use the work without the copyright holder's permission would
interfere with the formation of market mechanisms. 69
Fair use, under that view, is a narrow exception to the "privatization"
of intellectual property. 7° Fair use would apply only where transaction
costs interfere with the centralized control through licensing with the
copyright holder. Such applications of fair use have been put into two
categories. 71 In the first, no agreement is reached because the transac-

66. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LA w 32-35 (4th ed. I 992)
(discussing how creation of exclusive property rights provides incentives for efficient use
of resources).
67. See id. at 33-35.
68. See id. at 33 (discussing how transferability of property rights permits
allocative efficiency).
69. Cf Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1393 ('The entitlement package is more than just
a way to give the author incentives to produce in the first instance. It also organizes the
way already-produced works are rationed and coordinated."); Hardy, supra, note I 2. at
234-40, 252-53 (arguing that concentrating entitlement in copyright holder facilitates
efficient transactions and use of work).
70. Hardy, supra note 12, at 240-42 (explaining that transactions that are usually
amenable to fair use are trivial or undertaken for unusually worthy purposes).
71. GOLDSTEIN, supra note I, at 10.1.
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tion costs to arrange the license would exceed the potential benefit For
example, a daily newspaper seeks to print two paragraphs from a
textbook in a book review, 72 The costs of arranging to get permission
from the textbook author (delay, communication, and negotiation) would
likely exceed the benefit of the use, meaning that if permission were
necessary the newspaper might likely forego the use, The second
category of uses that might be obstructed by transaction costs occur
when the user does not capture the entire benefit of the use, and thus
might not be able to pay for a license, 73 Some uses of a copyright
work, such as teaching, criticism, or research, benefit not just the
immediate users but society generally, But a teacher, a critic, or a
researcher may not be able to get the rest of society to pay for the
diffuse benefits flowing from their use of the work; the transaction costs
of dealing with all members of society and figuring out how much each
benefitted would be prohibitive, A license might be available, but the
fee might be prohibitive because it could not be recovered from the
ultimate beneficiaries, In both categories, allowing the use under fair
use would not harm the copyright holder, because by hypothesis a
licensing transaction was not feasible, Conversely, the transaction cost
approach would deny fair use even to valuable uses if they could have
been licensed, In many such cases, voluntary licensing would result in
both the realization of the social value and compensation to the
author, 74 As one influential law review article framed it, fair use would
apply only where three conditions are met: "(I) market failure is present;
(2) transfer of the use to the defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an
award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of
the plaintiff copyright owner," 75
So viewed, fair use is analogous to various real property doctrines that
have also been justified by the existence of transaction costs, 76 The
owner of real property normally has the right to exclude others from her
property. Others who enter must have her permission, or commit
trespass. In a situation of necessity, however, such a voluntary
transaction may be impossible. Accordingly, the doctrine of necessity

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 10.1.1.
Id. at 10.1.
Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1615.
Id. at 1614.
See Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392.
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permits entry without the perm1ss10n of the landowner. 77 Fair use,
under the transaction cost approach, is considered to play a role similar
to necessity: it applies where transaction costs block a beneficial,
voluntary license. By the same token, fair use, under such a view,
would be as strictly limited as the privileges to use others' real property.
If the doctrine of necessity were too widely applied, then people could
use the property of others without seeking permission. Such externalities
would lead to the same inefficiencies as the tragedy of the commons.
Likewise, if fair use is applied where permission could have been
sought, then intellectual property would be used inefficiently.
The transaction cost approach diverges dramatically from the
traditional approach to copyright law, which has generally seen copyright
law as setting a balance between the incentives given to authors and the
costs of access to the public. 78 The greater protection copyright law
gives copyright holders, the greater the cost of access to those works for
consumers and other authors who use copyrighted works. 79 Thus,
analysis of copyright law frequently speaks of striking a balance,
whether it be between authors and the public, or between authors and
subsequent authors. Along the same lines, analyses of the fair use
doctrine have often spoken of the need to balance competing interests. 80
The transaction cost approach would generally eschew such balancing
analysis, leaving choices about resource allocation to be answered by
market mechanisms. A defendant would not be able to argue for fair
use by showing that the benefits from her use outweighed the detriment
to the copyright holder. Rather, under the transaction cost approach, if
such a surplus existed, then presumably the defendant would be able to
pay for a license. Only if the transaction costs were greater than the
potential surplus might fair use be applicable-and even then, only if it
did not harm the plaintiff. 81

77. POSNER, supra note 66, at 174.
78. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1995).
79. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 12 (analyzing copyright law in terms
of weighing incentives to authors against costs to other authors).
80. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 972 (1991) ("Whereas the fulcrum of the
economic balance struck by patent law is the standards for patentability, the most
important economic pressure point in copyright law is not the question of
copyrightability but the question of fair use."); see also Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 889-90 (1997)
(discussing fair use as analogous to patent law mechanisms that balance incentives of
intellectual property).
8 I. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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The transaction cost approach thus seeks to shift the balancing from
the province of the courts to that of the market Rather than having
judges decide whether the benefits of a use outweigh the decreased
incentives to authors, allocation would be left to market mechanisms,
Under this view, someone who believes they have a valuable use for a
creative work would presumptively back up their belief with a willingness to pay (or ability to persuade the copyright holder to permit the use
without requiring a fee), Accordingly, fair use would be applied as
sparingly as possible, because permitting people to use copyrighted
works without a license interferes with the ability of market mechanisms
to allocate resources through pricing information, From the copyright
holder's point of view, how much others are willing to pay for particular
uses provides the information necessary to decide how best to make use
of the creative work,
Such a view also represents a shift from the traditional view of the
role of copyright law, The conventional view is that copyright served
as an necessary incentive for authors to produce creative works; 82 the
transaction cost approach extends the role of copyright law to providing
a baseline for the efficient exploitation of works that have already been
produced, Such a view has implications for copyright beyond fair use,
A brief discussion of copyright duration will serve to contrast the
privatization and balancing approaches, Proposed legislation before
Congress would extend the duration of a copyright by some twenty
years, 83 Under the present statute, an individual author's copyright
lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years, and the copyright in a
work-for-hire lasts seventy-five years from the year of publication, 84
Pending legislation would extend those terms to life-plus-seventy and
ninety-five years respectively, 85 Such extensions would apply to

82, See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 29 (early formulation of the incentive analysis of
intellectual property); Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 357-58 (setting up framework
for incentive analysis of copyright law doctrines).
83. For information on the proposed legislation, together with criticism of the bill,
see Dennis Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension (visited Feb. 3, 1998)
<http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjalal>. For trenchant criticism, on the grounds that
extension would benefit mainly "a very small group: children and grandchildren of
famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the public domain," see
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907,932 (1997).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 1996).
85. Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. 604, 105th Cong. 2 (1997).
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copyrights presently existing, as well as future copyrights. 86 Under the
incentive-to-produce approach, applying the extension to existing
copyrights would be unnecessary; no additional incentive is necessary
where the works have already been produced. 87 Moreover, the
lengthened term for future copyrights also has little justification from the
incentive point of view. Whether an author's copyright will outlive her
by fifty or seventy years will have little effect on her decision on
whether to write a book or create a painting. If one accepts the
privatization rationale, however, such legislation would seem more
justified. Extending the term of copyright leaves it in private hands
longer before it falls into the public domain, meaning that the copyright
holder retains an incentive to find the most productive use of the
copyright. Under such a view longer copyright terms would provide
incentives for investment in new uses and for allocation of works to the
highest-valued use.
The transaction cost approach to fair use would similarly support
increasing the scope of copyright protection. One way to effectively
increase the scope of the copyright holder's exclusive rights is to narrow
the limitation provided by fair use. An increase in copyright duration
would require legislative action. The narrowing of fair use, however, has
been begun by more restrictive judicial opinions among the lower courts,
underpinned by academic commentary. 88 Two Supreme Court opinions, Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated v. Nation Enterprises 89
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Incorporated, 90 can be interpreted
to support the transaction cost approach, 91 although this Article will
argue in Part III for a broader reading of the opinions. 92 Harper &
Row held fair use inapplicable where the defendant magazine, the
Nation, had printed several hundred words of former President Gerald
Ford's autobiography without permission shortly before it was to be

86. See id.
87. See Karjala, supra note 83.
88. See sources cited supra note 12.
89. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
90. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). For further discussion on parody and fair use, see Fisher
v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping
on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and Campbell v. AcujfRose
Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1996); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell:
Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991); A.
Hunter Farrell, Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted Material in Advertisement Parodies, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1550 (I 992).
91. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98 (arguing that Harper & Row adopted
a neoclassical economic view that would restrict fair use to "highly circumscribed
instances of bilateral market failure.").
92. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88.

78

[VOL. 35: 61, 1998]

Copyright
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

published. The Court observed in a footnote that some economists have
written that fair use should apply only where the market will not
function, 93 The Court also quoted a noted study of fair use that
concluded the core issue was, "would the reasonable copyright owner
have consented to the use?" 94 One can interpret that as supporting the
proposition that fair use should apply only where a reasonable copyright
holder would have permitted the use, had transaction costs not interfered.
The support Campbell lends to the transaction cost approach is more
indirect. Campbell held that 2 Live Crew's parody version of "Oh,
Pretty Woman" could be a fair use of the original version of the song.
Such a result is consistent with the transaction cost interpretation of the
parody cases. Making a parody of a copyrighted song constitutes
making a derivative work, which would normally be within the
prerogatives of the copyright holder. But, just as transaction costs can
block a licensing agreement, so could the fact that the parody makes fun
of the original song. 95 An author is unlikely to license another song
that parodies their work, and is also unlikely to write a parody of their
own work. 96 Permitting the parody under fair use permits a use
without costing the author any revenue (because the author would not
have granted a license), the same reasons that justify applying fair use
in settings of prohibitive transaction costs generally.
Although
permitting the parody does undercut the owner's ability to control
productive uses, it does so only in an area where the owner is unlikely
to exploit the work. So Campbell's result can be seen as agreeing with
the transaction cost approach. But the next section raises the objection
that the author's reluctance to permit a parody seems inapt to cases, like
Campbell, where the copyright was no longer held by the original
author. More generally, this Article will argue the transaction cost

93. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 n.9 (citing T. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The
Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, DEPT. OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC POLICY OFFICE
DISCUSSION PAPER 13-17 (1984)); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 C0LUM.
L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982).
94. Id. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHT WORKS (1958),
reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16, prepared for
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1960)).
95. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992).
96. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993); Landes & Posner,
supra note 12; Winslow, supra note 90.
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approach underestimates both the complexities of the boundaries of
copyright and the obstacles to obtaining permission to use copyrighted
works.
II.

A CRITIQUE OF THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH

The transaction cost approach to fair use relies on a view of copyright
that creates easily traded parcels of intellectual property. 97 In order to
see that such property is used by the highest valued use, the parcels are
allocated to the copyright holder, who can sell any or all to the highest
bidder. By analogy to real property, thorough privatization of intellectual property is a necessary condition to permitting market mechanisms to
a form that will facilitate the most efficient exploitation of intellectual
property. 98 This Part first argues that the analogy to real property is
undermined by the nature of the boundaries of copyright, which are far
more difficult to determine that those of physical property. It may be
easy to identify copies of a copyrighted work, but a copy is not
coextensive with the property right. The Part next argues that the
transaction cost approach overestimates the fluidity of markets for
intellectual property. Although some transaction costs may be reduced
in an era of networked communications, others will increase. Moreover,
other obstacles to transactions exist beyond the basic costs of arranging
licenses. 99
A.

Boundaries

The rationale for privatizing property relies on readily identifiable
borders. 100 The boundaries of physical property are generally rather
straightforward to determine. 101 The boundaries of real property are

97.

For a critique of the economic conceptualization of property, see MARGARET

JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).

98. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 219; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and
Benefits; Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 472-73
(1992) (arguing that concentrating rights in copyright owners facilities efficient use by
requiring prospective users of the work to bargain with copyright holders).
99. The arguments and assumptions of the property rights argument, as applied to
treatment of improvements of copyrighted works, have been criticized on the grounds
that various obstacles to market transactions exist. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 104869 (discussing difficulties of identifying and organizing improvers, and obstacles
imposed by transaction costs, uncertainty, externalities, strategic behavior, noneconomic
incentives, and problems of market power and hold-ups).
100. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 234-36.
IOI. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1378-84 (discussing physical edges of
tangible property and intellectual property's functional equivalents); see also Timothy
P. Terrell & Jane Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and
Economic Analysis of the lnheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. I, 24 (1985) (discussing
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readily described by metes and bounds or other methods. The boundaries
of a piece of physical personal property are readily apparent. The owner
of a car can tell where the car ends and the pavement begins. Conversion and nuisance, the core torts involving property rights, are both
notoriously difficult to define. 102 But the material that is the subject
of the property right is itself usually easy to identify. Boundary drawing
problems are the exceptional cases, such as in concepts of commingling
or accessions, where personal property has been mixed together. 103
The transaction approach to fair use assumes that property boundaries
in copyright are readily identifiable, but this assumption misses the
distinction between the physical copies of a work and the property rights
afforded by copyright. For example, the notion that the Internet will
drastically reduce transaction costs rests on the assumption that a copy
of a copyrighted work, encoded with information on contacting (or just
paying) the copyright holder will readily identify the copyrighted
property to be licensed. But a copy of a copyrighted work is not like a
parcel of property. Rather, every copy unavoidably contains both
copyrightable elements and noncopyrightable elements that are not the
copyright holder's to sell. 104 Rather than the readily ascertainable
boundaries of physical property, the intellectual property afforded by
copyright is demarcated by the notoriously indeterminate boundaries of
the originality requirement and the idea/expression distinction. The
non original elements in the copy and any ideas (or functional elements,
or facts, or methods of operation, and so on) are not part of the
copyright holder's interest. One can hardly discern those by examining
the copy in isolation. 105 Where commingling and accessions are
relatively uncommon problems in dealing with physical property,
intellectual property's lack of "thingness" compared to tangible property).
102. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 35,
765 (1982) (describing conversion as highly technical and quoting a description of
nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle") (quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co.,
362 N.E.2d 968 (1977)).
103. See U.C.C. §§ 9-314, 9-315 (1997) (complicated statutory scheme attempting
to address competing interests where goods become accessions, i.e., goods installed in
or affixed to other goods).
104. But see Hardy, supra note 12, at 246-47, 260 (acknowledging boundarydrawing problems posed by the idea/expression dichotomy, but concluding that the cost
of drawing borders will be no higher for informational property than for real property).
105. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 32 (discussing the difficulty of determining how
much of a published new arrangement of a musical work is public domain material and
how much is protected).
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analogous problems inhere with every copyrighted work, because each
work combines original expression with nonprotected elements. The
boundaries are abstract and vague. With respect to originality, the
boundary may be so uncertain as to be impossible to draw. 106 Every
creative work necessarily incorporates nonoriginal elements. 107 The
line between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas is
likewise elusive. In the leading case on the distinction between ideas
and expression, Judge Learned Hand stated that it was necessarily an ad
hoc determination: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can." 108
It is no easier to determine which aspects of a work are
noncopyrightable functional aspects. Courts have faced difficult
decisions in drawing that line, holding that an artistically appealing beltbuckle is copyrightable, 109 but that a model of a human torso used to
model clothes was not. 110 A light stand with fanciful dancing figures
serves a function but has sufficiently separate aesthetic aspects to be
copyrightable, 111 but a light fixture with an abstract shape was held to
be functional and thus noncopyrightable. 112 Courts have similar
problems with computer programs. 113 The recent cases, culminating
in the Supreme Court's indeterminate four to four split in Lotus v.

106. See Litman, supra note 32, at 1023 ("Copyright law purports to define the
nature and scope of the property rights it confers by relying on the concept of originality.
In fact, originality is an apparition; it does not, and cannot, provide a basis for deciding
copyright cases."); see also BOYLE, supra note 13, at 163-64 (discussing how intellectual
property law has manipulated the concept of originality).
107. See, e.g.. Yen, supra note 90. It is also difficult to decide how much original
contribution is required to qualify for copyright. A court recently held that the West
Publishing Company·s versions of federal court opinions did not qualify as "original
works of authorship," where West had added minor changes to the case captions, the
names of judges and attorneys. and other factual material. See Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94,0589 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997). The court thus did not
follow a heavily criticized opinion that had accorded West protection in its arrangement
of cases and internal pagination, and denied fair use. See Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West
Publ"g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996).
108. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
I 09. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980).
110. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. I 985).
11 L See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
112. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
113. See, e.g .• John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under
Learned Hand"s Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases. 91 MICH.
L. REY. 526 (1992). Leading cases in the area include: Apple Computer v. Microsoft,
35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1991); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that an operating system program may be copyrighted, because there are many ways to
express the same functions).

82

[VOL. 35: 61, 1998]

Copyright
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Borland, have given little definitive guidance. 114 Courts readily agree
that the functional aspects of a computer program are not protected, but
have been unable to formulate any clear guide for separating the
functional aspects from the expressive aspects. 115 The leading case on
point, Computer Associates, 116 formulated a test that simply restates
the abstractions analysis. 117 Indeed, some commentators have argued
that software's inherently functional aspect makes it sufficiently different
from other creative works to require a new form of intellectual property
protection. 118 The fact that copies of works necessarily contain both
copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements leads to another a problem
that Part III will suggest is addressed by fair use. 119 The copyright

114. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'], Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (]st Cir. 1995), ajf'd by
an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (]996) (holding that a spreadsheet program's
menu command structure was not copyrightable subject matter); see also Bateman v.
Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (similar); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural
Software, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995) (restricting copyright to nonfunctional elements
of user interface); Glynn S. Lunney. Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer
Programs, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2397 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User
Interfaces, and Section 102/b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v.
Paperback, 6 HlGH TECH. L.J. 209 (I 992); Robert L. Bocchino, Jr., Note, Computers,
Copyright, and Functionality: The First Circuit's Decision in Lotus Development Corp.
v. Borland International, Inc., 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467 (1996); Michael J. Schallop,
Comment, Protecting User Interfaces: Not as Easy as 1-2-3, 45 EMORY L.J. 1533
(1996).
115. On the difficulties courts have faced, see Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does
Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of
Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723 (1988). See also Dennis M. Carleton, A
Behavior-Based Model.for Determining Software Copyright Infringement, 10 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 405 (] 995).
116. Computer Assoc. Int'! v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992); see also Jon S.
Wilkins, Note, Protecting Computer Programs as Compilations Under Computer
Associates v. Altai, 104 YALE L.J. 435 (1994).
117. Subsequent decisions have found Computer Associates persuasive. See Mitek
Holdings v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996) (addressing, as an issue of
first impression for the circuit, the scope of copyright protection for nonliteral elements
of computer programs); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th
Cir. 1994); Autoskill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1992).
On applying the abstraction testing to software, see David W. T. Daniels, Comment,
Learned Hand Never Plaved Nintendo: A Better Wav to Think About the Non-Literal,
Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REY. 613 (1994). See also Richard
A. Beutel, Software Engineering Practices, and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can
Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1991) (attempting to distinguish between functional and descriptive
elements).
118. See Samuelson et al., supra note 56.
l 19. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88 (regarding fair use).
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holder's control over copies of the work may lead to control over
noncopyrighted aspects of the work, especially with respect to digital
works that are generally disseminated as undifferentiated copies.
The uncertainties of boundaries in copyright counsel against expanding
the exclusive rights by narrowing fair use. The privatization rationale
is sharply undercut if property boundaries are unclear. Privatizing
property is a means to provide the owner an incentive to find the most
efficient use of the property. To the extent that the owner is unsure
where the boundaries lie, or unaware of how broadly the boundaries
have been extended, the incentive to exploit that intellectual property is
undercut. 120 At the same time, to the extent others are unsure whether
certain uses are protected by copyright or whether they fall in the public
domain, potential users are discouraged by the chance that their activity
may be infringement. Expanding copyright would likely exacerbate
boundary drawing problems. To the extent that the exclusive rights of
copyright holders are expanded at the expense of the public domain,
uncertainties about the borderline cases will also increase.

B.

Transaction Costs

The other premise of the transaction cost approach is that voluntary
transactions will lead to more efficient exploitation of creative works
than permitting fair use. 121 Markets, whether for copies of works or
for licensing uses and derivative works, indeed play the primary role in
disseminating creative works, both with respect to the copyrighted
aspects "belonging" to the author and to the noncopyrighted elements
unavoidably carried along. But the transaction cost approach, which
would rely almost exclusively on voluntary transactions as long as
transaction costs were no obstacle, greatly underestimates the obstacles
to voluntary transactions in some settings. First, even world-wide
networked communications will not diminish many aspects of transaction
costs. More important, other impediments remain, such as risk aversion,
status considerations, and information costs. 122

120. Cf Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, IO
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 437 n.37 (1992) (discussing how welfare maximizing
effects of property entitlements may be offset by bargaining costs introduced by
vagueness in copyright entitlements). In some settings, a little uncertainty about a legal
entitlement may promote bargaining. See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules
Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, l04
YALE L.J. ]027 (1995).
121. See infra text accompanying 144-88 (regarding fair use).
122. One can question the validity of applying fair use only in situations where
transaction costs prevented a license. Because litigation costs are even greater:
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The transaction cost approach suggests that increased use of digital
technologies will dramatically lower transaction costs, which would
justify a narrowing of fair use, 123 In the near future, many or most
copyrighted works could be in digital form for dissemination over
communications networks, or networks of networks such as the
Internet 124 Copyright holders could readily post the terms on which
works could be licensed, including various prices for different uses and
conditions on use, 125 Thus, a potential user would often need to do
little more than click a mouse to license a use. In such a world, the
argument runs, transaction costs will be so low as to drastically reduce
or even eliminate fair use and other exceptions to the copyright holder's
exclusive rights. 126 But that argument views transaction costs narrowly, from the view of the copyright holder. It contemplates that the
copyright holder will set a schedule of charges and offer it to potential
users. A user who did not fall into one of the listed categories, or had
a potential use that the copyright holder had not contemplated, would
still have to attempt to contact the copyright holder and negotiate an
individualized license. 127 In a world where copyright holders increasingly rely on mechanical licensing, such individualized requests may
indeed be less likely to receive full consideration. A related problem is
that expanding the prerogatives of the copyright holder permits the
holder to appropriate all the surplus value from new uses of the work,
even where part of such value arises from the independent contribution
of others.

It is hard to imagine a plaintiff bringing a lawsuit (much less going all the
way to the Supreme Court) over a use small enough that she would have been
willing to license it but for transaction costs. The absurd implication of this
theory is that in any case important enough to be litigated, fair use should
never apply!
Lemley, supra note 25, at 1077 n.394.
123. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14 at 197-236; Hardy, supra note I, at 259-60; see
also Benjamin R. Kuhn, A Dilemma In Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for
Intellectual Property Distributed Over the Information Superhighways of Today and
Tomorrow, 10 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 171 (1996); see also Cate, supra note 8, at
1425 (discussing how digital technologies could reduce the scope of fair use in licensing
transactions).
124. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 197-236.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 223-24.
127. Negotiating and executing a license for such intellectual property as software
can be expensive and time-consuming. See Lemley, supra note 25, at I 053-54.
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One initially appealing argument for stringent limits on fair use,
particularly on the Internet, is that it would support publication of
material for small, specialized audiences. 128 Considering there might
only be a few people world wide that are interested in an esoteric
subject, if fair use allowed even a few people free access to the work,
it would greatly reduce the necessary incentive to produce the work.
Thus, the argument runs, restriction of fair use will permit much greater
diversity of expression. But the argument goes too far. Restricting all
fair use in order to protect a few esoteric markets is unnecessary. The
effect on the market for the copyrighted work is a key factor in fair use
analysis, but one can distinguish between different markets. A small use
that threatened to destroy an entire small market would be unfair; a
small use that had little effect on a large market might be fair.
Other market failure explanations of fair use have similar flaws. As
discussed above, parody is often seen as a classic example of fair use
justified by market failure. 129 An author is unlikely to license another
work that parodies their work, so the presumptive reliance on voluntary
transactions will not work. But a closer examination undermines this
analysis. Campbell shows that parodies often could be licensed. In
Campbell, the subject of the parody was a song by Roy Orbison. By the
time the parody was written, the copyright was in the hands of AcuffRose. This is not an exceptional case. 130 Because of the work-for-hire
rule 131 and transfers of copyright, 132 many if not most significant
copyrights are in the hands of corporate owners rather than individual
creators. 133 The copyright in a work frequently is transferred by the
author. In the case of works for hire, the copyright vests not in the
actual author but in the employer. If making a parody of such a work
is a viable commercial project, then the sensibilities of the copyright
holder (as opposed to the original author), would often be no obstacle.
Moreover, in the cases where the original author is the copyright owner

128. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 229-30.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
130. On parody and fair use, see Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(D)
Place in Tran.,formative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion From Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653 (1995). See also L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987).
13 1. The copyright in a work made for hire rests in the employer, not in the
individual that creates the work (unless otherwise agreed upon). 17 U.S.C. § 20l(b)
(1995).
132. Copyrights may be transferred in whole or in part. 17 U.S.C. § 20l(d) (1995).
133. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873,883 (1997); Lemley, supra note 25 at 1033-34 n.212 (estimating that
more than 40% of copyrights are works made-for-hire, on the basis of early study and
recent trends in copyrighted works).
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and refuses to license a parody, terming that market failure is too broad,
A rational author might well refuse to take money in exchange for
subjecting their creations to distortion and ridicule, 134 So the transaction cost explanation of parody is both overbroad and too narrow,
The next Part suggests that a better explanation lies in using fair use
to permit free flow of uncopyrightable ideas. 135 More generally, the
privatization rationale behind the transaction cost approach to fair use
proves too much. If fair use should be narrowed in order to maximally
privatize copyright, then the same reasoning would support narrowing
other limitations on copyright. In particular, logical extension of the
privatization argument would argue for narrowing the basic rule that
copyright does not protect ideas. If intellectual products are most
effectively exploited by converting them into property, then to some
extent ideas should be copyrightable. But ideas are better developed by
making them freely available for use, criticism, and development by all.
Before turning to an alternative conception of fair use, there are
additional fundamental objections that might be made to the transaction
cost approach. Even if privatizing copyright were more efficient than
permitting a broader scope for fair use, one could argue against it simply
on distributional grounds, that granting greater initial entitlements to
authors is sufficiently inequitable to overcome any efficiency justifications. Second, one could turn away from the incentive analysis of
copyright law to other philosophical frameworks. The privatization
approach to copyright, which logically supports considerable expansion
of the right of copyright holders, has led some to reject economics as a
basis for prescriptive analysis of copyright law. Such commentators
argue instead for a natural rights approach 136 or see copyright as

134. See Lemley, supra note 25; Yen, supra note 90. See also Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (discussing how personal
value of property may be more important to the owner than financial aspects).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 172-78.
136. Professor Wendy J. Gordon has written leading explorations of both economic
and natural law bases for copyright. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Se/fExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of' Intellectual Property, I 02
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). See also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (arguing that natural law is
inherent to copyright). A natural rights approach could support a considerably narrower
copyright than an economic property rights approach. See Gordon, supra. See also R.
Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on
Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995) (applying Lockean
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intended to foster a utopian society 137 or a civil democratic society.138 This Article will argue in a more pragmatic fashion that
arguments for maximal privatization of copyright (which support the
transaction approach to fair use) fail on their own terms. Natural rights
analysis might provide a more satisfactory philosophical basis for
copyright than economics does, but consideration of natural rights is less
likely to provide a guide to specific applications of fair use. It seems
rather unlikely that sufficient consensus will form any time soon on the
content of natural rights or even on whether natural rights are simply
"nonsense upon stilts." 139 One could also construct an argument
against the privatization approach on constitutional grounds. Congress
is authorized to promote knowledge by granting copyrights to authors
and patents to inventors. 140 One could interpret that provision as
limiting copyright to measures providing an incentive to produce
works. 141 The Supreme Court has stated that Congress lacks power to
authorize patents that remove knowledge from, or restrict access to, the
public domain. 142 The same limitation could be applied to the copy-

natural rights analysis to the issue of copyright duration). Other critics of the broad
approach of copyright law have relied on literary theory rather than natural rights to
argue that copyright places too much emphasis on an illusory view of the creative
contribution of individual authors. See BOYLE, supra note 13; Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455.
137. See Fisher, supra note I.
138. See Netanel, supra note 24; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights
and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1993).
139. Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in AGAINST THE LAW I 04 (1997)
(quoting Jeremy Bentham in the discussion of a natural rights framework for discussing
the Constitution). A basis for a critical theory of copyright might be a Lacanian
analysis, which has to date been employed much less in legal than in literary theory.
See DAVIDS. CAUDILL. LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 3-25 (1997) (discussing barriers to and benefits of
applying Lacanian framework to legal theory).
140. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Heald,
supra note 32, at 251 (suggesting that it may be unconstitutional to use copyright other
than to provide incentives for new creations); see also Margaret Chon, Postmodern
"Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97
( 1993) (suggesting that the Constitution grants a right of access to knowledge).
I 41. Cf Cate, supra note 8, at 1396 ("The Copyright Clause requires the
government to carefully tailor those rights to not provide excessive incentive to the
creation and dissemination of expression.").
142. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I (1966); see also Tung Yin, Reviving
Fallen Copyrights: A Constitutional Analysis of Section 5I4 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994, 17 LOY. L. A. ENT. L.J. 383, 393 (1997).
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right power, which is in the same clause of Article I of the Constitution. 143 Expanding fair use at the expense of the public domain would
arguably violate that limitation. Until such time as the Court speaks to
potential constitutional or philosophical arguments, however, the fair use
doctrine will play the primary role in determining the extent of the
privatization of copyright
III.

FAIR USE AS A MEANS TO IMPLEMENT OTHER
COPYRIGHT LIMITS

This Part argues that the fair use doctrine has a broader role than
conceived by the transaction cost approach. Certainly, fair use can be
justified by prohibitive transaction costs in many settings where a
potential user could not reasonably locate, contact, and negotiate with the
copyright holder and other affected parties. Thus, the existence of
transaction costs may justify as fair use many de minimus uses that the
copyright holder would not object to, such as copying a story from the
day's newspaper to send to a friend. But this Article will argue that the
role of fair use is broader and more central to the overall structure of
copyright law. Under the transaction cost approach, the balance between
the interests of copyright holders and potential users is set by the
requirements of originality, the idea/expression distinction, and the other
limits on copyrightable subject matter. Fair use, under that view, serves
only as an exception to the property right under exigent circumstances.
This Article will argue that fair use has served a broader, more flexible
role to implement the other limitations. This will be termed the
"balancing approach" to fair use. In this view, fair use should apply not
just where transaction costs obstruct licensing, but also where mechanical
enforcement of the copyright holder's exclusive rights would grant the
holder excessive control over noncopyrightable elements of the work.
This approach is consistent with the common conception of fair use as
balancing competing interests, and contrary to the view that fair use
should wither away as technology lowers the costs of disseminating

143. See Patry, supra note 83, at 914-15 (arguing that copyright extension may be
unconstitutional because it would not serve the purpose of inducing production of new
works); see also Yen, supra note 52, at 393 (discussing possible constitutional limits).
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works. 144 Under this rule, fair use would serve the same policies as
copyright infringement analysis generally. 145
The balancing approach to fair use would not simply balance the
benefits from a particular use against the possible detriment to the
author. 146 This would result in an unnecessarily broad view of fair
use. Copyright exists to provide authors returns that exceed marginal
cost. The balancing role of fair use, rather, is the same as the balancing
function of the originality requirement, the idea/expression distinction,
and other limitations on copyright. Each of those limitations serves to
protect authors against free-riders (and thus provide incentives for
authors to produce otherwise piratable public goods), but also avoids
granting authors excessive returns. This Part will discuss how the case
law under fair use can be broadly construed as attempting to implement
that balance. The next Part then discusses how fair use will fit into the
rapid expansion of digital technologies. As discussed above, some
transaction costs will be reduced and accordingly copyright holders may
justifiably seek revenue in settings that might have been fair use. But
digital technologies will also lead to broader application of fair use.
Because digital technologies involve copying as part of use, some uses
that might have been outside the copyright holder's exclusive rights may
now involve making a copy. Fair use may thus be necessary to prevent
the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from undue control
over the noncopyrightable aspects of her work.
This conception of fair use is both broader and less unified than the
transaction cost approach. Fair use, under this view, is analogous to the
good faith doctrine in contract law. Cases finding bad faith are not
susceptible of a single theoretical justification. 147 Rather, they resemble each other in a more general way that has been compared to

144. Fair use analysis by courts and commentators has long been framed in terms
of balancing. although the elements described are frequently different. See, e.g., Heald.
supra note 80, at 972 (describing fair use as the key pressure point in copyright's
economic balance); David A. Rice, Sega and Berond: A Beacon fi,r Fair Use Analysi.,
... At Least as Far as it Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1131 (1994) (arguing that fair
use is a safety valve for settings where mechanical application of copyright's exclusive
rights would run contrary to the fundamental principles of copyright); Kreiss, supra note
78, at 9 (arguing copyright generally and fair use in particular strike a balance between
incentives and access to works); see also Landes & Posner supra note 12, at 326
(arguing copyright should strike a balance between incentive to authors and costs to
authors of access to existing works).
145. Cf KAPLAN, supra note I, at 68 (discussing how fair use can play a similar
role in the infringement analysis).
146. Cf. Fair Use, supra note 12. at 1615.
147. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
88-94 (I 985). See also Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392 (suggesting that fair use may
serve several purposes, analogous to the various privileges in property law).

90

[VOL. 35: 61, 1998]

Copyright
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. 148 Similarly, the resistance of the fair use doctrine to simple definition, which courts and
commentators have long bemoaned, may be key to its flexible role.
Accordingly, this section will discuss how courts have applied fair use
to prevent copyright owners from restricting use of copyrighted works,
protecting functional aspects of works, controlling facts, even shielding
governmental expenditures from criticism. In each case, transaction
costs would not have prevented a licensing agreement; rather, applying
fair use diminished the ability of the copyright holder to realize revenue
from the work. This Article will further argue that such a balancing
approach provides a more satisfying interpretation of the parody cases
and is consistent with the Supreme Court's fair use opinions.
Where some copying is necessary in order to use a work, courts have
applied fair use. 149 Under the transaction cost approach, permission
from the copyright holder would have been required, but judicial
decisions have been to the contrary. The classic example is Crume v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, in which the copyrighted book set out
step-by-step guidelines for reorganizing corporations, complete with
wording of model legal documents. 150 The court held that fair use
authorized such copying as was necessary to implement the plans. 151
Accordingly, there was no infringement where defendant copied the
wording from the book into the documents drafted to implement such
transactions. Similarly, Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Company152 held that fair use permitted copying from an advertising manual,
which had provided forms and model advertisements. 153
Perhaps the best example of using fair use to permit access to
uncopyrightable aspects of works is its application to computer software.
Courts have applied fair use to authorize copying to exploit the
unprotected functional aspects of digital technologies. 154 Such deci-

148. BURTON, supra note 147, at 91-94.
149. Cf Litman, supra note 32, at 983-84 (discussing cases holding that copyright
does not protect a way of doing things).
150. Crume, 140 F.2d 182, 183 (7th Cir. 1944) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 103 (1879)).
15 I. Id. at 183-84.
152. 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914).
153. Accord American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1941 ).
154. See DSC Communications v. DGI Tech., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
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sions have held that fair use authorized reverse engineering, which
entails making a copy of a program in order to study the operational
aspects of the program. 155 Again, the transaction cost approach would
have yielded a different result. A license could have been negotiated
that authorized such copying for limited purposes. But presumably the
licensing fee would have been high, because the software copyright
holder would often prefer to keep such functional aspects from
disclosure, in order to maintain a competitive advantage. So if copyright
prevented making copies necessary to figure out the unprotected
functional aspects, then the copyright would in effect extend to the
functional aspects of the program. By permitting reverse engineering,
fair use thus serves to restore the balance struck in the rule that
copyright protects only expressive, not functional aspects.
Just as fair use permits some copying to get at the unprotected
functional aspects of a copyrighted work, it may also have the effect of
unlocking unprotected factual aspects of a work. In Time Incorporated
v. Bernard Geis Associates, 156 a book about the assassination of

of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Sega and Atari gave rise to considerable
commentary. See. e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1994); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of
Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, I 126-27 (1995) (distinguishing between competition and
usurpation); Kreiss, supra note 78; Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and
Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087 (1994); Rice, supra note 144 at 118788 ( 1994 ); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents,
Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975 (1994); see also
Gary R. lgnatin, Note, Let the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering of
Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1999
(1992); Christopher W. Hager, Apples & Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use
After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 259
(1994). For a thorough discussion of the practice of reverse engineering, see Andrew
Johnson-Laird, S()ftware Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
843 (1994 ). See also Teter, supra note 35. For a critique of the Sega rationale, see
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 978
( 1993). See also Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia,
Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 903 (1994).
155. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Professor Cohen has argued
persuasively that such cases serve the overall objectives of copyright law and provide
a guide toward the role of fair use in adapting copyright law to new technologies. See
Cohen, supra note 154, at 1130-34; see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th
Cir. 1996); Vanessa Marsland, Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of
Software-An EC/UK Perspective, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1021 (1994); Paul Durdik,
Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use Defense to Software Copyright Infringement, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 451 (1994).
156. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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President Kennedy illustrated its theories by borrowing from a copyrighted work, the home movie of the event made by a spectator, Abraham
Zapruder. 157 Working from frames of the movie (which were publicly
available as exhibits to the Warren Commission report on the assassination), defendants made charcoal sketches representing the scene as
portrayed in the movie. 158
Courts have also used fair use in a more subtle way to balance the
incentives of copyright by distinguishing between "productive" and
"reproductive" uses. 159 A reproductive use simply makes copies that
compete with the copies authorized by the copyright holder. 160 Where
a use is productive, however, defendant goes beyond copying to
contribute some independent value. 161 Productive uses have been more
likely to qualify for fair use. Making a copy of a computer program in
order to study it as a process of writing other programs would be a
productive use. 162 Copying a program in order to sell it in competition
with the copyright holder would be a less favored reproductive use. 163
The transaction cost approach would give much less weight to the
productive nature of the use. If the new use was productive, then
presumably an appropriate licensing fee could be paid from the surplus
created. 164 Moreover, requiring licensing fees would enable the
copyright holder to determine which uses were the most productive and

157. Id.
158. Id. Commentators have argued that fair use should apply where some copying
is necessary to get at uncopyrighted aspects of a work. See Cate, supra note 8, at 1455
(arguing that fair use should apply where the user reproduces facts and ideas from a
copyrighted work); Heald, supra note 32, at 262 n.121 (arguing fair use would permit
copying of a copyrighted English translation of a public domain Latin hymn in order to
extract the public domain aspects).
159. See Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair
Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair
Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.
667 (1993).
160. See Lape, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975
F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
163. Cf Allen-Myland v. Int'! Bus. Machs. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 533-35 (E.D.
Pa. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); accord Cable/Home
Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (denying fair use to
wholesale copying of a chip).
164. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note I, at 10.43.
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license them accordingly. 165 But such failure to recognize the productive nature of some uses permits the copyright holder to capture as much
as possible of the new value created by such uses. It could also have
perverse effects on the incentives created by copyright. 166 If copyright
holders have a greater ability to capture the value created by their work
than do other activities, than resources could be channeled toward
creation of copyrightable works and away from other productive
activities not protected by such a monopoly. 167
Fair use can also serve to implement the more narrow limitations on
copyrightable subject matter. Works of the United States government
are not subject to copyright protection. 168 Because the government has
funded the work, copyright is not necessary to provide an incentive for
its creation. Moreover, granting the government exclusive rights to
control dissemination of its products raises serious questions about
accountability. The decision of Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Association 169 introduced such policy matters into the fair use balance.
In Wojnarowicz, federal funds supported an art exhibit. 170 Defendant,
who objected to the content of the exhibit, published a pamphlet that
reproduced parts of the supposedly objectionable works. 171 Because
federal funds had supported display and dissemination of the works, the
court reasoned that fair use would be more broadly construed, to permit
copying if it were necessary in order to object to use of tax revenues.
The previous Part discussed how the transaction cost approach
provides an unsatisfactory explanation of the fair use parody cases. 172
The ready application of fair use to parody is better understood as
implementing the principle that the author has no control over the ideas
expressed in their work. In order to free others to attack those ideas, a

165. 17 U.S.C. § l07 (Supp. 1995). Rather, the transaction cost approach would
tend to limit favored uses to those categories specifically named in the statute: "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research." See GOLDSTEIN, supra
note I, at l0.2- I0.2. l.
166. See Lunney, supra note 18.
167. See KAPLAN, supra note I, at 75 (warning that excessive copyright protection
could attract "too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the
economy"); Lunney, supra note 18, at 489 (proposing that, in order to prevent copyright
from creating allocative inefficiencies, that copyright should "produce works of
authorship if, and only if, such production would represent the most highly valued use
of their resources").
168. 17 U.S.C. § l07 (1995).
169. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36. On the need for a theory of
parody, see Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A
Theory for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 227 ( 1993).
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parody may be permitted as fair use. Parody also illustrates the role of
status considerations. In those cases where the author does control the
copyright, the author is likely to refuse permission to a parody because
of status considerations.
A contest between superheroes illustrates the ill fit of the transaction
cost approach with parody. In Warner Brothers, Incorporated v.
American Broadcasting, Incorporated, 173 ABC's television program
"The Greatest American Hero" parodied Superman with a more diffident
superhero. As discussed above, the transaction cost approach would
justify the application of fair use by an author's presumed unwillingness
to license a parody. But this was not a setting where the author's tender
feelings would have prevented a voluntary licensing transaction. The
original authors of Superman had sold their copyright in the cartoons
many years ago, and were now living in modest circumstances. 174
The copyright to Superman was held by a corporation, which has shown
considerable interest in maximizing the revenue from Superman. Indeed,
the parties had considered a licensing agreement. Nor was the parody
one which would have so offended the author as to prevent permission.
Rather, the program very gently poked fun at some of the standard parts
of the Superman stories. So a better explanation of the application of
fair use is that it permits authors to parody other works without
permission because such freedom fosters the creativity that copyright
exists to support.
The balancing approach also provides a more coherent basis for the
recent fair use decisions of the Supreme Court. As noted above, Harper
& Row has been interpreted as following the transaction approach to fair
use. In holding that fair use did not authorize the Nation to print several
hundred words of Gerald Ford's autobiography, the Court indicated that
fair use should apply where a reasonable copyright owner would have
consented to the use. 175 Harper & Row is entirely consistent with a
balancing approach to fair use. One could argue that fair use should
have applied in order to prevent control over noncopyrighted facts. But
the Nation could have reported the relevant facts without taking Ford's
173. 720 F.2d 23 I (2d Cir. 1983).
174. See Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., Jerry Siegel, Superman's Creator, Dies at 81,
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 31, I 996, at B6 (relating how the creator of Superman sold the
copyright in 1938 for $130 and thereafter worked as a messenger and a typist).
175. 471 U.S. at 563 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT§ l.JO[C] (1996)).
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expression of them. Rather, the Nation quoted entire passages of Ford's
writing. The Court stated that some direct quotation may have been
necessary to convey the facts, such as Ford's "characterization of the
White House tapes as the 'smoking gun,"' 176 but most of the facts
could have been paraphrased.
Harper & Row frames fair use as whether a "reasonable" copyright
holder would have consented to the use. One can read that as asking
whether the copyright holder would have agreed to license the use, had
transaction costs not interfered. 177 But that requires a departure from
the normal understanding of the reasonable person standard. Judge
Learned Hand, whose landmark opinions continue to set the terms for
copyright analysis, certainly gave a different content to the test in the
familiar formulation from United States v. Carroll Towing, 178 which
questions whether a reasonable person would take a precaution by asking
whether the cost of the precaution is less than the expected damages to
the potential victim. The test forces the actor to consider both the costs
to themself and to the potential victim-a balancing test. Similarly, fair
use can balance the incentives to the author against the costs to potential
users. Thus, under Harper & Row, fair use analysis would certainly
consider whether the copyright holder would have sought a licensing fee
for the use. But where a fee would have included a premium traceable
to protection of noncopyrightable material (such as functional or factual
aspects of the work), a court could hold that a reasonable copyright
owner would not have sought such leverage.
A recent case concerning a videotape of a notorious incident shows
how the transaction cost approach is too narrow to address the necessary
concems. 179 The Los Angeles News Service videotaped the assault of
a truck-driver during disturbances in Los Angeles. The news service
licensed other media outlets to show the tape for a fee. One local
television station copied and showed portions of the tape without
permission, and raised the defense of fair use. Under the transaction
cost approach, the case is straightforward. Fair use would clearly be
inapplicable, because the use could have been licensed. But the case,
like Harper & Row raises issues of protection of facts and matters of

176. 471 U.S. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHT WORKS
(1958), reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16,
prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1960)).
177. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98.
178. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
179. Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir.
1997).
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public concern that require a closer examination, although a balancing
analysis might well reach the same result on those particular facts.
The other recent key Supreme Court decision on fair use, Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 180 reads much more
consistently with a balancing approach than with the transaction cost
approach. In Sony, the holders of copyrights in television programs
sought to hold the manufacturers of videocassette recorders liable for
contributory copyright infringement, for selling machines that consumers
used to copy television programs. 181 The Court held that fair use
authorized individuals to "time-shift" programs, to tape programs for
later viewing. Transaction costs would indeed prevent licensing in
individual situations. It would be quixotic for a student to seek
permission from Monty Python to tape an episode while the student was
in class. But such transaction costs do not justify fair use where
mechanisms exist for collective licensing. If Sony had denied fair use,
then VCR manufacturers could have arranged to pay a royalty from
VCR sales to organizations representing television copyright holders. 182
Rather, Sony rests on the idea that a copyright holder's prerogatives
should not give it control over markets beyond the market for its work.
If the Sony court had denied fair use, then the television copyright
holders would have effectively controlled not just the market for their
work but also the market for video cassette recorders. 183
The transaction cost approach is also hard to square with the many
cases holding that some types of harm to the copyright holder will be
disregarded in the fair use analysis. 184 Hustler Magazine v. Moral
Majority 185 held it was fair use for the Moral Majority to reproduce

180. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
181. Id.; see also Ariel B. Taitz, Comment, Removing Road Blocks Along the
Information Superhighway: Facilitating the Dissemination of New Technology by
Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 133
(I 995).
182. See Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1656; see also Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N.
Kirby & Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L.
REV. 383 (1992).
183. Id.
184. One can provide for such holdings by broadening the understanding of "market
failure" to include settings where the copyright holder refuses to license a use out of
"anti-dissemination" motives. See Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1632-35.
185. 796 F.2d I 148 (9th Cir. 1986).
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material from Hustler magazine in its fund-raising circular. 186 Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corporation 187
upheld use in advertising of passages from the Consumer Report's
product assessments, even if such use could arguably damage Consumer
Report's credibility. National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun
Control Federation of Ohio 188 held fair use authorized distribution of
a list of legislators prepared by a lobbying organization. In such cases,
transaction costs were not the obstacle to licensing. Rather, fair use was
appropriately applied to prevent the copyright holder's exclusive right to
make copies from becoming an instrument for controlling the flow of
ideas.
Fair use can thus be interpreted as a tool to implement the core
limitations on copyright, rather than simply a device to apply when
transaction costs obstruct licensing agreements. The next Part contrasts
the analysis of the balancing and transaction cost approaches in several
settings.

IV.

APPLICATIONS

This Part takes problems in fair use (from cases, proposed legislation,
and life in the digital age) and compares the transaction cost and
balancing approaches. Rather than a detailed application of the statutory
factors, this Article will focus on the key differences between the two
modes of analysis. The transaction cost approach (rooted in the
privatization view of copyright) focusses on the question, whether the
parties could have reached an agreement to license the use. The
balancing approach (seeing fair use as balancing incentives) goes on to
consider whether denying fair use would effectively grant the copyright

186. See Fisher, supra note I, at 1741 n.352; see also New Era Publications Int'!.
v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (use of author's writings in an
unfavorable biography deemed unlikely to harm sales for authorized biography);
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (use in writings against
legalized abortion deemed unlikely to overlap market for pro-choice writings);
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reproduction of federally supported artwork in pamphlet opposing funding for National
Endowment for the Arts deemed not competing in market for art); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (no cognizable market harm in parody
use of Pillsbury doughboy); but see Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp.
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding market for artist's work could be harmed by advertisement
copying his work, on grounds that it suggested artist had licensed the use).
187. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Arica Inst. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067
(2d Cir. 1992); Mathieson v. Associated Press, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1685 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (no
showing that use by a new service harmed the market for copies of a photograph of a
bulletproof vest endorsed by Oliver North).
188. 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994).
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holder a measure of control over noncopyrightable aspects of the work,
such as ideas, functional aspects, or markets other than those to sell or
license the work. The fair use issues discussed here involve quite
different types of copying: copying a letter to comment on its author,
copying a computer program in the process of using it, copying a digital
work while circumventing anti-copying technology, copying cartoon
characters to comment on their cultural place, copying a web page to
include it in a massive archive, and photocopying scholarly works for
students and researchers. The transaction cost approach would accord
presumptive control over copying to the copyright holder, unless
negotiating a license were impractical. The balancing approach would
consider whether the type of use at issue should be beyond the control
of the copyright holder. A case that encapsulates the contrast is Lish v.
Harper's Magazine Foundation. 189 Harper's Magazine printed lengthy
excerpts from the letter of a writing teacher sent to solicit students for
a writing seminar. 190 The letter both reflected the unusually secretive
nature of the seminars and showed the teacher's rather eccentric writing
style. The court denied fair use in terms consonant with the privatization approach, holding that the teacher should be able to strictly control
distribution of his writing. A balancing approach would have more
given weight to the letter's status as a record of the writing style of
someone holding himself out as a writing teacher. Publishing excerpts
of the letter would not compete with sales of the author's work, although
the implicit criticism might have hurt the teacher's reputation. Fair use,
under a balancing approach, could serve to prevent such an author from
controlling debate about his work.
Moving to a broader problem, fair use could help adjust copyright law
to the prevalence of copying as an aspect of both use and dissemination
of digital works. In particular, fair use can provide a tempered approach
to the issue of whether a temporary copy in the working memory of a
computer constitutes a copy for the purposes of copyright law. 191 At
the risk of oversimplifying, a computer generally uses two types of

189. 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
190. Id.
191. On the fixation issue, see, e.g., Douglas J. Masson, Comment, Fixation on
Fixation: Why Imposing Old Copyright La\\' on Ne\\' Technology Will Not Work, 71 IND.
L.J. 1049 (1996).
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memory: permanent memory and working memory. 192 Suppose an
individual owns a personal computer with various types of software
loaded onto it. While the computer is turned off, the software will sit
in the permanent memory (which could include the computer's hard
disk, ROM chips, the floppy disks distributed in its vicinity, compact
discs or other media such as tapes). When the computer is turned on,
it activates its working memory. Any software that the computer
accesses must be copied from permanent memory into working memory,
because the processor of the computer works primarily with that small,
fast, dynamic memory. So the operating system software (which runs
the computer) and any applications software (broadly understood,
anything that the user uses or interacts with other than the operating
systems software) all must be copied to the extent they are used. So to
utilize a computer program, indeed even to tum on a computer, causes
some software to be copied within the computer. Courts have held that
making such a temporary copy constitutes making a copy for the
purposes of copyright law. 193
Some have argued that a temporary copy within a computer's working
memory should not constitute a copy for the purposes of copyright
law. 194 In this view, one makes a copy only by making a permanent
copy. Implementing that view might require a shift in judicial authority
or an amendment of the present wording of the copyright statute. 195
But, more fundamentally, excepting temporary copies from the scope of

192. One could also use the terms random access memory and permanent storage.
See IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 506, 554 (1994).
I 93. This aspect of the decision followed the holding of MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th. Cir. 1993). See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on
the "Information Superhighway": Authors. Exploiters. and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1476 (1995) (collecting criticism of the MAI decision). For
criticisms of the MAI decision on various grounds, see Trinnie Arriola, Software
Copyright Infringement Claims After MAI Systems v. Peak, 69 WASH. U. L. REV. 405
(1994). See also Katrine Levin, MAI v. PEAK: Should Loading Operating System
Software Into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
649 (1994); Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software
Users' Rights in the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 44 DUKE L.J. 327 (1994).
194. See Cate, supra note 8, at 1453 ("There is considerable logical support for
finding that RAM is not fixed.") (citing Pamela Samuelson, The Nil Intellectual Property
Report, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 21, 22-23 (Dec. 1994); Jessica Litman, The
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 42 (1994-95)). See also
Lemley, supra note 25, at l015-16 n.122 (collecting authority on the temporary copy
issue).
195. Cf Johnson, supra note 193. The issue of whether temporary RAM or screen
"copies" are sufficiently fixed to qualify as copies for the purposes of copyright law has
not been definitively settled. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 542 (1997) (discussing statutory
issue and authorities on point).
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copyright law could threaten the legitimate rights of copyright holders,
by permitting dissemination of copies if recipients did not save them in
permanent form. 196 On the other hand, mechanically treating a
temporary copy made without permission of the copyright holder as
infringement can swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.
The case law on the potential liability of computer maintenance
providers shows the hazards of such reasoning. 197 The leading case,
Triad Systems v. Southeastern Express, 198 provides a good example.
Triad Systems made computers used by automotive parts dealers for
various bookkeeping tasks. 199 Triad sold the software that ran the
computers and performed the bookkeeping functions.2'JO Triad also
sold its services to maintain Triad computers, in competition with an
independent service organization. 201 To service a Triad computer, the

196. See Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright
law Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169
(1995); see also David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139, 151
n. 29 (1996) (discussing use of anonymous remailers to post documents that allegedly
infringed copyrights). Even if temporary copies were not subject to the exclusive
reproduction right, however, such dissemination might infringe the exclusive distribution
right. See Lemley, supra note 195, at IL B (discussing application of distribution right
in the network context). Several legislative attempts have, so far unsuccessfully,
attempted relatively narrow authorization of coping for the purpose of using a program
or servicing a computer. See Bill Would Permit 'Rightful Possessor' of Program to
Authorize Copying, 49 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 303 (1995) (analyzing
proposed bill that would authorize rightful possessor, rather than just the owner, of a
program to authorize loading into RAM). Legislation has also been proposed that would
authorize the making of a copy of a program where such copy was made solely by
activation of the computer for maintenance. See H.R. 1861, 104th Cong.§ 7(3) (1995).
197. See Triad Sys. v. Southeastern Express, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995);
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp 356 (E.D. Va. 1994); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Pamela
Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software:
Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to
Accommodate A Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179 (1987).
198. 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). Triad has been criticized as extending the power
of copyright holders beyond the market for the copyrighted work into the market for
services. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 1025-26, 1025 n.179; Stephen M. McJohn, Fair
Use of Copyrighted Software, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1997). See also Chad G. Asarch,
Note, Is Turn About Fair Play? Copyright Law and the Fair Use of Computer Software
Loaded Into RAM, 95 MICH. L. REV. 654 (1996) (concluding that consideration of the
statutory fair use factors should authorize an ISO loading software into RAM).
199. Triad, 64 F.3d at 1333.
200. Id.
201. For other cases involving manufacturers and independent service organizations,
see Service & Training v. Data General, 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
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independent servicer would run the software provided with the computer,
including the operating system, utilities and diagnostic programs, which
would require that the software be copied from the permanent storage
(either the computer's hard disk or a tape drive) into the computer's
working memory. 202 The Ninth Circuit held that such use did not
constitute fair use, in terms that track the transaction cost approach.
Under the balancing approach to fair use, however, the independent
servicer would likely qualify for fair use. 203 The servicer was making
a productive use of the software that was copied. The use also sought
to exploit the functional aspects of the work, to use it in order to service
the very computer the software was provided with. Although the Ninth
Circuit did not explore the issue, it is also likely that the servicer was
employing nonoriginal as well as original aspects of Triad's work. 204
It seems unlikely that Triad wrote operating system software and
applications software without using other programs as models or even
incorporating code from public domain sources. 205 Applying fair use
would prevent a computer manufacturer from having a monopoly on the
market to service such computers, a market separate from the market for
software to run on the computers.
The balancing approach also leads to less strict protection than has
been proposed for digital "copyright management." 206
Nascent
technologies promise the ability to code copies of digital works to permit

argument that manufacturer misused software copyright through licensing restrictions).
See also Datagate v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust, 910 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Kan. 1995); Advanced Computer Servs. of
Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
202. Triad, 64 F.3d at I 333.
203. For a discussion of how the application of fair use in Triad would prevent
excessive copyright protection, see McJohn, supra note 198.
204. For a recent case holding that a plaintiff copyright holder could survive a
motion for summary judgment without identifying the original components of the alleged
infringed work, see Fonar Corp. v. Robert Domenick, 105 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
205. Trends in intellectual property law affect the use of existing software in the
process of software production. See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1996).
206. For a thorough discussion of copyright management technologies, proposed
federal legislation, and possible constitutional dimensions to the issue, see Julie E.
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyber.1pace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) [hereinafter Copyright Management]; Julie
E. Cohen, Some Reflections 011 Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to
Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997) [hereinafter Reflections]. See also
Sherri L. Burr, The Piracy Gap: Protecting Intellectual Property in an Era of Artistic
Creativity and Technological Change. 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245 (1997); Michael
Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 213 (1995).
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copyright holders to closely monitor and control any use made of the
copies:
Thus, for example, if I purchase a collection of essays online, the copyright
owner can charge me for the file containing the essays, generate a record of my
identity and what I have purchased, and insert pieces of microcode into the file
that will: (I) notify the copyright owner every time I "open" one of the essays
and specify which one I opened; (2) notify me when I must remit additional
fees to the copyright owner-this much to browse the essay, this much to print
it out, this much to extract an excerpt, and so on; and (3) prevent me from
opening, printing, or excerpting the piece until I have paid. 20

One catch to using technological devices to prevent copying is that
people can figure out ways around them, As a lexicon of computer
jargon puts it: "copy protection: n. A class of methods for preventing
incompetent pirates from stealing software and legitimate customers from
using it Considered silly," 208 Proposed legislation in Congress would
give copyright holders considerable legal weapons against anyone who
tried to circumvent such protections, It would be illegal to provide
devices or services that "avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise
circumvent" such copyright management systems. 209 It would likewise
be illegal to tamper with "copyright management information," broadly
defined to include not just the name of the copyright holder but any
terms and conditions the owner proposes for use of the work. 210
Because such works are precisely the ones for which fair use would no
longer be available (transaction costs having been shrunk by the

207. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 981-82.
208. THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY (Eric s. Raymond ed., 2d ed. 1993). Some
have suggested that copyright holders should be expected to rely on such technologies
in lieu of, rather than in addition to, the protections of copyright law. See Eric
Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law
Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 38-49 (1997)
(discussing how various technologies could substitute for protections of copyright law).
209. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 990. A closely related issue is the
enforceability of such terms. See Lemley, supra note 22 (discussing enforceability of
"shrinkwrap" terms proposed in network transactions); John E. Murray, Jr., The
Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 Duo. L. REV. 533, 550-65 (I 997)
(discussing proposed revision of the Uniform Commercial Code that would govern
whether standard terms became part of the contract in many electronic transactions);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997) (discussing tensions between federal
copyright law and state contract law); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits
of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY L.J. 93 (1997).
210. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 990.
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copyright holder posting terms for use), fair use would presumably not
excuse any such tampering; nor does the proposed statute make these
strict protections subject to fair use. Such stringent protection follows
as a matter of course from the transaction approach. Copyright owners
may attach to each copy precise terms for any possible use and any user
must either agree to and abide by those terms or go elsewhere. The
balancing approach to fair use would suggest a more tempered approach.
Recognizing that the copyright protection code locks up not just
copyrighted expression but also unprotected ideas and nonoriginal
elements, a balancing approach would amend (or interpret) the proposed
statute to allow access in some settings, even if that involved circumventing the protective coding.
It is instructive to compare the proposed high level of protection for
copyright management technology with the present, considerably lower
level of protection for the artistic integrity of works. Under Section
106A, the author of a work of visual art may prevent others from
distorting, mutilating, or destroying the work. 211 But these protections
are sharply circumscribed. The moral rights apply only to works like
painting, sculpture and limited edition photographs, and specifically
exclude works for hire. 212 Moreover, the moral rights are specifically
made subject to fair use. 213 So although it may be legal to distort or
mutilate a digital artwork, it may soon be illegal to fiddle with the
legalese attached to it. A balancing approach would avoid such an
incongruity.

211. 11 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). See also Jane C. Ginsburg. Copyright in the
101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477 (1990);
Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists Moral Rights: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997) (discussing whether
copyright doctrines in the United States perform a similar function to moral rights in
other jurisdictions in controlling reputational externalities); Geri Yonover, The
Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody. and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 79 (1996).
212. 17 U.S.C. § IOI (1994) (The definition of "work of visual art" defines the
scope of the moral rights conferred under section 106A. ). Moral rights could also be
based upon existing common law concepts. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of

Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors,
23 GA. L. REV. I (I 988). The exclusive right to make derivative works can be seen as
equivalent to moral rights. See J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The
Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797, 813
(1991 ).
213. 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (I 995). Whether fair use is properly applicable as a limit to
an artist's moral rights has been questioned. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the
Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 38 (1997)
(arguing that "fair use and federal moral rights are inherently incompatible" and calling
for courts to ignore the statutory language).
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Another area that would be treated differently under the transaction
cost and balancing approaches is fair use in creating derivative works.
The logic of privatization favors broad protection of the exclusive right
to make derivative works (the right to recast the work into new forms).
Concentrating the right to make derivative works in a single person
would give an incentive to exploit that right in the most efficient
manner. Along these lines, granting the copyright holder in a book the
exclusive right to make a film based on the book is thought to avoid a
"multiple taker" problem. 214 Unless a single person has the right to
make the film of the book, no one would have the incentive to invest the
many millions of dollars now necessary to make a feature film. This
claim is certainly debatable as an empirical matter. The recent spate of
Jane Austen films, all based on public domain material, certainly shows
that exclusive rights to a book are not essential to permit the necessary
investment in a movie. More important, the logic of this approach
would lead to a broad interpretation of the derivative right, in order to
prevent unauthorized competitors. Such a broad interpretation would
stifle not just commercial competition, but permit the copyright holder
to control the cultural view of the work. Under the balancing approach,
the copyright holder would still have the right to make derivative works,
but the leeway afforded to comment, criticism, and other uses would be
much greater.
To take an example, the privatization approach would support the
holding in Walt Disney Production v. Air Pirates. 215 The defendants
in Disney produced a counterculture comic that portrayed various Disney
characters engaged in distinctly nonDisney activities, such as drug use
and bawdy behavior. 216 The Ninth Circuit denied fair use. 217 Such
a result reflects the privatization rationale of the transaction cost
approach, which would leave it to Disney to decide on the most effective
commercial exploitation of its characters. If the public demand for
works portraying Disney characters in such a light were sufficient, then
Disney itself could produce them. If Disney were concerned that such
comics could adversely affect its use of the characters in other areas,
however, then Disney could prevent any such works. A balancing

214.
215.
216.
217.

See Netanel, supra note 24.
581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id.
Id.
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approach to fair use, however, might reach a different result. Portrayals
of Disney characters so engaged might well harm the sales of Disney
products, but not in a way that would favor Disney in the balance of
incentives. The comics would not substitute for Disney's sales of its
copyrighted work. Rather, the comics effectively brought into question
the role that Disney characters play culturally. 218
Air Pirates also shows another flaw in maximizing reliance on
voluntary licensing to produce new works incorporating elements of
existing works. The author of an existing work is likely to be considerably more risk averse than other authors who wish to incorporate it into
new works. Thus, Disney would balance possible revenues from a new
work against the risks to sales of previous works, thus considerably
discounting the value to Disney of using its characters in new ways.
An author with no vested interest in the existing works is more likely to
try something risky. Willingness to take risks is often a key ingredient
to creative work. Accordingly, granting authors expanded control over
new uses of their work is likely to have considerable dampening effects
on cultural flourishing. This certainly does not counsel depriving
copyright holders of the control over markets for their work or of
derivative works that spring from their work. But it does suggest that
the bounds of fair use cannot be set simply by asking whether a use
could have been licensed. The privatization view confuses the change
in an idea with the depletion of a resource. 219 As discussed above, a
strong reason for privatizing physical property is that placing it in private

218. For another case in which use of Disney material was not protected as parody
under fair use. see Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp .. 389 F. Supp. I 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting fair use of Disney·s "Mickey Mouse March," performed by
actors wearing nothing but Mouseketeer hats in the film The Life and Times of the
Happy Hooker). The Ninth Circuit recently held fair use inapplicable to a parody of The
Cat in the Hat, rewritten to be an account of the O.J. Simpson case. See Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., I09 F. 3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). The court held
that the parody used copyrighted elements not in order to comment on the original but
simply to gain attention. Id. The balancing approach would deny fair use where the
parody form was used simply as a means of free-riding, as opposed to employing the
ideas, or on criticizing or commenting on the style of the original. See also Castle Rock
Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying fair use to
a book of trivia questions about the television series Seinfeld, where the book used
significant portions of copyrighted shows with relatively little additional material); David
London, Comment, Toon Town: Do Cartoon Crossovers Merit Fair Use Protection?,
38 B.C. L. REV. 145 (1996) (arguing that fair use authorizes parody in cartoon of
characters from other cartoons). At some point, using copyright to stop critical speech
raises constitutional questions. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 ( 1970): E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. REV. 319 (1996).
219. See Lemley, supra note 25, at I 049 (noting that ideas, unlike real property,
cannot be subjected to "over-use").
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hands allows market forces to allocate it to the highest valued use. But
informational works are not depleted, rather they are tested, propagated,
and transformed through use.
The transaction cost and balancing approaches would also yield
different results on whether copyrights are being infringed by a project
currently underway to archive the Internet's World-Wide Web. 220
Under the transaction cost approach, such an effort would likely not
qualify for fair use, particularly if such archiving exceeded any limitation
stated expressly on the web page or elsewhere. The makers of such an
archive are in a position to use market forces to capture the benefits of
their effort, by charging access fees to anyone who wants to utilize the
archive. The archivists would only have to pay web page authors who
demanded payments, not everyone on the entire Internet. So if
transaction costs were the guide, fair use might not authorize the project.
By contrast, the balancing approach would likely hold the archiving to
be fair use, even where it exceeded the permission granted by individual
web page authors. 221 The archive has considerable historical and
research values and has little effect on the incentives of authors.
Moreover, much of what the archive would capture would not be
covered by copyright. Many web pages contain noncopyrightable facts
on functional aspects, as well as copyrightable expression. So a
balancing analysis would likely permit archiving as fair use.
In each of the foregoing examples, the transaction cost approach yields
a simple but troubling analysis, because it excludes important policy
considerations. The balancing approach may require a more complicated
analysis, but that simply reflects the fact that the distinctions on which
copyright relies are complex. Concepts like originality, ideas, and
functionality have defied easy definition and will continue to do so.
The recent controversial decisions on photocopying illustrate how the
balancing approach supplements, rather than displaces, the transaction
220. Brewster Kahle, Preserving the Internet, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar. 1997,
at 82. The archivists are presently addressing the issue simply by letting authors exclude
their works. Id. On how networked communication may assist the law, see Michael
Rustad, Legal Resources for Lawyers Lost in Cyberspace, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 317
(1996); Eugene Volokh, Computer Media For the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L REV.
2058 (1996),
221. A rather widespread but open issue is the extent to which fair use authorizes
caching of files posted on the Internet. See Cyberspace Law Institute, Copyright Law
on the Internet: The Special Problem of Caching and Copyright Protection (last
modified Sept. I, 1995) <http://www.cli.org/Caching.html>.
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cost approach. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 222 Texaco
maintained a library of scientific and technical journals. Texaco
regularly informed its researchers of recently published articles and
provided photocopies of articles to the researchers upon request. In
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 223 a
copyshop received lists of book excerpts from university instructors,
made photocopies of the excerpts and sold them bundled into
coursepacks. Appellate courts ultimately denied fair use in both cases.
Both cases involve uses favored in fair use analysis, research and
education. 224 Nonetheless, neither appears to be a case where the
copyright holder was seeking protection of unprotected aspects of the
work. Had this been a competitor trying to impede Texaco's research,
an author seeking to keep critical students from reading the work, or a
software producer worried that young hackers might figure out its
programs and write better ones, then fair use would be more apt. But,
at the risk of oversimplifying, both cases boiled down to a commercial
entity systematically providing a cheaper source of copies than the
copyright holder. Certainly, fair use would likely apply if the potential
user could not otherwise get copies at a reasonable price. But if Texaco
could fund copies from the revenues following from its research, or if
students could purchase copies at a reasonable price (or, more likely, if
the publishers would license photocopies of excerpts to be made), then
denying fair use could simply be enforcing the balance struck by the
general outline of copyright law.
V.

CONCLUSION

The transaction cost approach might simplify fair use analysis. But
the clarification of the doctrine would only distort the overall effect of
copyright law. Mechanical enforcement of the exclusive rights in some
settings could effectively give copyright holders a measure of control
over noncopyrightable ideas and functional aspects of their work. Such
a prospect, in turn, would simply shift the balancing concerns to the
infringement analysis. Clarifying fair use by surgically narrowing it
would only complicate other areas of copyright law. The difficulty in

222. 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994).
223. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cen. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
224. One might argue for applying fair use on redistributive grounds, on the basis
that students and researchers are favored classes of users. See Merges, supra note 18.
See also Anna M. Budde, Comment, Photocopying for Research: A Fair Use Exception
Favoring the Progress of Science and the Useful Ans, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1999 (1996)
(arguing that fair use authorizes photocopying of scientific research articles in both
industry and universities).
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fair use simply reflects the difficulty in defining the boundaries of
copyright. Fair use originally arose as part of the infringement analysis
in copyright cases. 225 Fair use has served to adapt copyright to several
generations of technology, but has become a tangled doctrine in the
process. The transaction cost approach bids to reduce fair use to a
simple, quantifiable analysis and remove it from the core issues of
copyright. But copyright law will adapt to digital technologies best by
retaining its flexibility. 226 Fair use can serve as a means to implement
the other limits on copyright. The works subject to copyright are
increasingly being created and disseminated in digital forms, and digital
technologies copy works repeatedly for many functions. A balanced
approach to fair use can help protect the copyright holder's prerogatives
while preserving the limitations on those exclusive rights.

225. See FAIR USE, supra note I, at 18-64 (discussing early development of fair use
in United States case law); see also KAPLAN, supra note I, at 67-70.
226. See KAPLAN, supra note I, at 69-70 (arguing that fair use analysis invokes
policy considerations just as much as the rest of the infringement analysis).
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